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Abstract
This paper investigates the sustainability of public finances in the Euro-
pean countries since 2002. We provide evidence of heterogenous behaviors
among the EU countries and show that, even if they had been forced to fo-
cus their fiscal efforts on correcting the deviations of debt from their ceiling
-through a correcting mechanism such as the recent TSCG rule-, this would
not necessarily have changed the likelihood that debt and deficits become
more sustainable. Sources of deviations from stable debt and deficits are
related to the macroeconomic environment: the interest-growth differential,
momentum dynamics in the sovereign bond markets, how markets react to
rising debt.
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1. Introduction
This paper proposes a behavioral approach to study the conditions of
sovereign debt sustainability in the European countries. Almost a decade af-
ter the 2010 public debt crises in the eurozone, the issue of the sustainability
of public finances continues to give rise to debates in the policy arena. The
data provided by the European Semester 2019 document show that a number
of countries with significant economic weight in the EU are in a situation of
high risk of debt unsustainability illustrated by their high public debt ratio:
Belgium (101.3%), France (99%), Italy (133.7%), Spain (96.3%) and Portugal
(119.5%). The Greek sovereign debt has even reached a level around 180%
of GDP, despite a high structural budget surplus around 5%. The sustain-
ability criterion used by the European Commission is the S1 indicator, which
measures the cumulative 5-year structural fiscal adjustment effort required
for the debt ratio to reach 60% of GDP in 2032. In the Italian case, it would
require cumulative surpluses of 9% of GDP, 5.2% in Spain, 4.2% in Belgium,
France and Portugal. The Commission also looks at another medium-term
sustainability criterion, S2, which measures the adjustment needed to stabi-
lize the debt ratio over an infinite period including the costs of aging. These
two criteria of sustainability are based on the idea that governments must
be solvent, which implies that the debt ratio should not explode over a finite
time horizon (for S1) and infinite time horizon (for S2).
In the theoretical literature on public finance, several concepts of fiscal
sustainability have been proposed. The sustainability of debt has been re-
lated to intertemporal solvency (when governments satisfy their intertempo-
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ral budget constraint), debt liquidity (when governments are able to service
their debt at any time). It is also common to define sustainable debt limits
(sometimes corresponding to steady state values), fiscal limits (a deficit be-
yond which fiscal insolvency is likely to happen). For a survey of the different
approaches, the reader can refer toAguiar and Amador (2014), Bouabdallah
et al.(2017).
The empirical assessment of debt sustainability is usually done using
cointegration techniques to investigate the joint dynamics of revenue and
spending (see, among many others, Bohn 2007 and, for a recent paper, Be-
qiraj et al. 2018), balance-sheet micro-based models (see Giammarioli et al.
2007), signal extraction models (see Dufre´not et al. 2016, Savona and Vezzoli
2015), stochastic debt sustainability models (see Aguian and Amador 2014,
Consiglio and Zenios 2017, Goedl and Zwick 2017), distribution models (see
Dufre´not and Paret 2019, Medeiros 2012).
This paper proposes a behavioral approach that relates debt sustainabil-
ity to the behavior of both fiscal authorities and financial markets. Some
examples of previous papers using behavioral models are Collignon (2012),
Gosh et al. 52013), Paret (2017). The idea is to go beyond the standard
accounting debt equation to better account for the role of fiscal policy and
market reactions. Specifically, the sustainability of public finance is related to
the way governments respond to rising deficits by stepping up fiscal retrench-
ment (through adjusting their primary balance). Financial markets reactions
also determine the sustainability of public finance through the reactions of
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investors to new fiscal developments when deciding upon the sovereign yield
spreads.
Testing the sustainability of sovereign debts and deficits in the EU using
a behavioral approach is appealing given the debates raised in the policy-
making arena since the 2010 sovereign debt crises. On important concern
was whether the higher sovereign bond spreads were caused by self-fulfilling
expectations in the markets, or whether this was a consequence of the de-
terioration of the countries’ economic fundamentals (see, for instance, Ayres
et al. 2018, De Grauwe and Ji, 2013). We study here the ability of the fiscal
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) to stabilize the long-term debt
ratio, given the prevailing financial conditions - e.g. the sensitivity of interest
rate premiums to debt ratios and macroeconomic fundamentals. In addition,
we investigate whether debt unsustainability was due to fiscal mismanage-
ment -the way governments have increased their primary balance in response
to overall deficits.
With regard to the role of fiscal authorities’ reaction in promoting the
sustainability of public debt, governments usually seek to avoid two pitfalls.
The first is the risk of unnecessarily restrictive fiscal policies. For example,
excessive fiscal consolidations in response to increased budget deficits may
ultimately be ineffective in lowering the debt ratio, if the effects on growth
are negative. This happened after the 2008 financial crisis due to the under-
estimation of fiscal multipliers (see Blanchard and Leigh, 2013, Fata´s, 2018).
The other risk is to adjust the primary balance insufficiently to lower the debt
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ratio, which happens for instance when there exists a procyclical fiscal bias,
or when the policies are not counter-cyclical enough (see Egert 2012 and,
more recently, the European Fiscal Board 2019). In this paper, we define a
condition for debt sustainability, based on the magnitude of the adjustment
coefficient in the fiscal rule in response to the evolution of deficits and debt.
We highlight the existence of bounds that depend on the parameters of the
fiscal reaction function and on the evolution of sovereign premia in response
to changes in the ratio of public debt and macro-financial variables.
In addition to the role of fiscal policy, we examine the conditions that de-
termine automatic changes in the public debt ratios due to the dynamics of
the growth-adjusted interest rates. In the literature, it is common practice
to link debt sustainability to the Keynes-Ramsey rule, which implies that
the adjusted interest rate (interest rate minus growth) must be positive (this
condition, known as dynamic efficiency, is necessary to satisfy the transver-
sality condition of the intertemporal budgetary constraint). From empirical
studies, we know that debt ratios can, however, decrease sharply even in
situations of dynamic inefficiency when the adjusted interest rate is low (see,
for example, Blanchard 2019). This debate has been re-energized in the cur-
rent context of low nominal interest rates in the industrialized countries (see
Basseto and Cui 2017, Blanchard and Summers 2017, Mehrotra 2017). In
this paper, we show that the important point for debt sustainability is that
the adjusted interest rate should not exceed a threshold. In a context of het-
erogeneous fiscal policies and different premiums, the threshold varies across
countries and over time.
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Our paper contributes to two strands of literature.
First, many authors have interpreted the concept of fiscal sustainability
as a situation in which the intertemporal budget constraint holds. This has
led to empirical works based on cointegration tests between fiscal revenues
and public spending (see the seminal papers by Bohn 1995, 1998, Trehan
and Wash 1988). Other papers also study cointegration between structural
primary surpluses and debt-to GDP ratio (see Beqiraj et al., 2018). This
interpretation has, however, been challenged. Bohn (2007) shows that coun-
tries may not satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint and, yet, have
sustainable public finances. An alternative literature has therefore proposed
the following interpretation. We first need to know whether there exists, over
a long time period, steady-state levels of sovereign debts, primary balances
and overall deficits. And, if yes, the issue is whether, following a shock, these
public finance variables deviate persistently from their steady-state levels. If
the answer is positive, then they are unsustainable. Otherwise, they must
be considered as sustainable. Collignon (2012) proposes an empirical model
where debt ratios and primary balances are modelled jointly and, he analyzes
the properties of the Jacobian matrix to investigate whether the steady state
variables are stable or not. He concludes that public debts have been highly
sustainable in the EU countries over the period from 1978 to 2009. Gosh
et al. (2013) relate the steady state debt ratio to fiscal space defined as the
difference between the current debt ratio and a debt limit. Using data on 23
advanced countries, they show that governments have become less reactive to
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rising debt since the latter has been very high (around 90%−100% of GDP).
Dufre´not et al. (2018) propose a model where debt ratios steady states are
co-determined with the inflation rate resulting from monetary policy under
fiscal dominance. They conclude that, during the transition to the steady
state, fiscal deficits can be ”locally” unstable, but ”globally” stable if fiscal
policy is Ricardian.
This paper extends previous approaches in two ways. First, we con-
sider that debt dynamics depends, not only on fiscal reaction functions, but
also on the dynamics of debt service. We therefore make the interest rate
endogenous and specify an equation of the determinants of risk premium.
Steady-state stability conditions therefore depend on the coefficients of fiscal
reaction functions and, on those of the determinants of interest rate spreads.
The main advantage of our approach is to link fiscal sustainability to both
fiscal governance and to the macro-financial conditions summarized by a dy-
namic efficiency condition. Second, we explicitly take into account fiscal
heterogeneity and the fact that financial markets may differenciate the coun-
tries when determining the interest rate premiums. These aspects need to
be adressed given the lack of fiscal integration in the EU (the idea of issuing
Eurobonds as the main instrument of sovereign debt remains a challenge due
to probable moral hazard problems). We show that regressions based on the
assumption of heterogenous coefficients lead results that differ significantly
from standard OLS regressions.
Secondly, our paper contributes to a recent literature on how to model
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heterogeneous fiscal reactions (slope heterogeneity) across countries, when
the estimations are done in a panel framework. Some papers suggest to use
nonlinear specifications. For instance, nonlinear panel models allow to dis-
criminate beween fiscal fatigue and a ”normal” positive reaction of primary
balance to higher debt ratio (see Egert, 2015, Everaert and Jansen 2018,
Nickel and Tudyka 2014). Other papers use dynamic CCE mean group es-
timator (Golinelli et al. 2018). Bouthevillain and Dufre´not (2016) propose
quantile regression estimations to account for fiscal policy heterogenous reac-
tions in the Euro area. We extend their methodology by ”crossing” the infor-
mation in the conditional quantile distributions of primary balance changes
and interest rate spreads. We account for four ”clusters” of countries and
time that are distinguished with respect to two criteria : small/large fiscal
adjustments and low/high intensity changes in yield spreads.
Our main findings are the following. First, we find little evidence of debt
and primary balance sustainability in the EU since 2002, when the fiscal
policy functions relate adjustments in the primary balance to overall deficit
and debt gaps (difference between the level of these variables and the policy
objectives defined by the Stability and Growth Pact -SGP-). The estimates
reveal that there have been little efforts of fiscal policies to react to debt gaps.
This may have been a source of the unsustainability of sovereign debts. We
also account for differences between governments regarding the role of mar-
ket spreads. For some of them, the negative contribution of excessively high
ajusted interest rates is added to that of fiscal policy insufficient reaction to
rising debts to make debt and primary balances unsustainable. We also find
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that, even in the case where the countries would have adopted the recent debt
corrective mechanism of the TSCG, few of them would have had sustainable
public finances.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our
behavioral model of debt sustainability. Section 3 contains the empirical
estimation and the investigation of the stability properties of the steady
state. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. A behavioral model of debt sustainability
2.1. A 3-dimension system to investigate debt dynamics
The concept of sustainability used here is not based on the examination
of governments’ intertemporal budget constraint. Rather, we investigate the
stability properties of a steady-state equilibrium in a system of equations in
which public finance variables move together. A formulation was proposed
by Collignon (2012). His model includes two endogenous variables: primary
balance and debt ratio. We extend this approach by making the interest rate
endogenous. This adds a dimension to the system to be studied.
• Debt accumulation
The first equation of our system is standard and explains how a country’s
debt ratio - outstanding stock of debt over GDP - changes according to
the initial level of debt ratio, primary balance (revenues minus expenditure
excluding interest payment), the real GDP growth rate and real interest rate:
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∆dt = (rt − gt)dt−1 − st, (1)
where ∆xt = xt − xt−1, dt is the ratio of sovereign debt over GDP, st is
primary balance, gt and rt are respectively real GDP growth rate and the
real interest rate (government bond yield).
• Overall deficit
The second equation is also standard in the literature:
deft = (rt + pit)dt−1 − st, (2)
where deft is the ratio overall deficit (expenditure -including interest spend-
ing - minus fiscal revenue over GDP) and pi is the inflation rate.
• Fiscal reaction functions in a European context
We specify a fiscal reaction function, e.g. a behavioral equation showing
how fiscal authorities adjust a fiscal instrument - here the primary balance
- according to various macroeconomic variables. This type of function is
described in the literature by reduced-form equations, which are assumed
to derive from both governments’ preferences and from the fiscal policy con-
straints they face. The latter are usually interpreted as fiscal rules. The rules
are defined according to different criteria : short- or medium-term targets,
public spending, debt ratios, etc. In the EU, a new fiscal compact was voted
in 2011 and launched in the countries in 2012/2013 (the new TCSG -Treaty
on Coordination, Stability and Growth-). It reforms the SGP by adding new
dimensions of macro-fiscal surveillance (automatic correction mechanisms,
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macroeconomic imbalance procedure, etc). The period under examination in
this paper (2002-2018) covers the SGP (10 years) and only 7 years of imple-
mentation of the TCSG. To avoid under-sizing the samples in the empirical
study, we do not split our sample in two sub-periods. We retain the common
denominator of the targets for these two periods. These are the 3% ceiling
on the budget deficit and 60% on the debt ratio. This leads us to model a
short-term fiscal reaction function. Our specification of the fiscal reaction
function is the simplest. Governments adjust the primary balance according
to the overall deficit of the previous period and to the debt ratio of the pre-
vious period’s. The new TCSG may have changed the governments’ fiscal
behavior. In this case, this should change the value of the coefficients that we
suppose here to vary across countries and over time (this point is discussed
in the empirical section).
Our basic specification is:
∆st = α(deft−1 − τ1) + β(dt−1 − τ2) + st , τ1 = (3%)/4, τ2 = (60%)/4. (3)
α and β measure the sensitivity of primary balance changes to, respectively,
overall deficit and, debt ratio. st is a noise component. We divide de targets
by 4 by assuming that an annual 3% target is equivalent to 0.75% quarterly
target (the same for the debt ratio target: using quarterly data, we define a
quaterly target as one-fourth ofthe annual target).
• The dynamics of the yield spread
Changes in the interest rate are governed by yield spreads in the sovereign
bond markets. There are empirical evidence in the literature that the fol-
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lowing factors are key determinants of the yield spreads: international risk
captured by the VIX, monetary policy (represented by the short-term inter-
est rate SRt), the financial cycle (measured by housing prices, HPt, stock
prices, SPt and credit to the private sector, creditt) and macroeconomic im-
balances (public debt ratio, current account balance, CABt, unemployment
rate, UNRt, real effective exchange rate, REERt, private debt ratio, pdt).
For a survey of the literature on the determinants of sovereign bond yield
spreads in the EU, the reader can refer to Afonso et al. 2015, Afonso and
Nunes 2015, Georgoutsos and Migiakis 2013). Our equation of the interest
rate differential is therefore
∆(rt − r∗t ) = β0(rt−1 − r∗t−1) + β1dt−1 + β2∆X ′t + rt , (4)
where Xt = (V IXt, SPt, SRt, UNRt, CABt, ). ∆X
′
t means that we smooth
the first-difference by using its 3-year moving average. (rt − r∗t ) is the yield
spread defined as the difference between a country’s interest rate and the
yield of a riskless asset.
From these equations, the joint evolution of debt, primary balance and
interest rate spreads is described by a 3-dimensional system of equations :
∆dt = (rt − r∗t − gt)dt−1 + r∗t dt−1 − st,
∆st = dt−2α(rt−1 − r∗t−2 + pit−1) + βdt−1 + αr∗t−2dt−2 − αst−1−
(ατ1 + βτ2) + 
s
t ,
∆(rt − r∗t ) = β0(rt−1 − r∗t−1) + β1dt−1 + β2∆X ′t + rt .
(5)
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2.2. Stability properties of the steady-state
We rewrite the system of equations in continuous time:
˙d(t) = [r(t)− r∗(t)− g(t)]d(t) + r∗(t)d(t)− s(t),
˙s(t) = α[d(t)(r(t) + pi(t))− τ1 − s(t)] + β(d(t)− τ2) + s,
˙r(t)− r∗(t) = β0[r(t)− r∗(t)] + β1d(t) + β2∆X ′(t) + r.
(6)
The dots mean time derivative. The steady-state corresponds to the fixed
point: 
s = d[r − g],
d = ατ1+βτ2
α(pi+g)+β
,
r = r∗ (β0−1)
β0
− β1
β0
[
ατ1+βτ2
α(pi+g)+β
]
− β2
β0
∆X
′
.
(7)
The stability conditions are obtained from the Jacobian matrix of the lin-
earized system and by applying the Routh-Hurwitz theorem. Details are pro-
vided in Appendix. The criterion for the asymptotic stability of the steady-
state amounts to examining whether the characteristic polynomial obtained
from the Jacobian matrix is stable. The conditions are based on the second
method of Lyapunov and a generalization of the so-called interlacing prop-
erty for polynomials of any order 3
This leads us to two propositions. Proposition 1 below refers to the ability
3The seminal papers by Routh (1877) and Hurwitz (1895), Lyapunov (1896) and
Lie´nard and Chipart (1914) show that only half of the original Routh-Hurwitz conditions
are needed for the stability of a characteristic polynomial.
13
of a government to service its debt in the short term: its borrowing condi-
tions should not tighten too much. Proposition 2 below defines conditions to
gauge the fiscal space of a government. The latter is defined in terms of fiscal
behavior as the ”minimum” reaction of primary balance to overall deficits
and debt, below which public finances sustainability is in doubt.
Proposition 1. A fiscal policy focused on debt and deficit targeting
(α 6= 0 and β 6= 0), is sustainable, if a government can service its debt, and
therefore if it is liquid. In this case, the following condition must hold:
(r − g) < (α− β0). (8)
See the proof in Appendix.
Proposition 1 defines a maximum threshold for the growth-adjusted in-
terest rate. To ease the repayment of debt service and avoid a situation
whereby governments are ”forced” by the markets to adjust their primary
balance because the risk premia are too high, there must be a ceiling on the
growth-adjusted interest rate. Two types of factors influence the determi-
nation of the ceiling. The first factor is fiscal policy (captured by α). The
second factor is momentum dynamics in the sovereign bond markets, which
characterizes the persistence of the interest rate spreads (here β0).
Proposition 2. In the medium/long-term, an increase in the debt ratio
and/or public deficits can happen without appreciable risk of unsustainabil-
ity, if the government fiscal reaction is sensitive enough to changes in debt
and deficits. The government must counteract the higher debt and deficits
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by increasing sufficiently its primary balance. In this case, the following two
inequalities must be satisfied:
α >
β0β
β1(d− 1)− β0(pi − g)
, (9)
β > α(β0 + pi − g) + (β1 − β0). (10)
See the proof in Appendix.
Proposition 2 provides a minimum bound to α and β. For public fi-
nances to be sustainable, the government needs to be reactive enough to
overall deficits and debt. Debt and deficits might become unsustainable, if a
government adopts a laissez-faire policy. This can happen if it decides that
higher deficits do not elicit and the reaction to changes in deficits and debt
is too weak. ”Weak” means that α and β remain below a given threshold.
Sustainability implies here mix targets on deficits and debt, which means
that the reactions are inter-dependent. For example, a government that puts
a great emphasis on the debt ratio target tends to adjust its primary balance
more strongly (which is reflected here by the fact that the threshold defined
on α increases with the value of β). Similarly, in the second inequality, the
threshold of β is an increasing value of α: a government tends to react sig-
nificantly to the debt ratio, if it is ready to adjust more sharply its primary
balance.
The threshold values depend on several factors : a) how the yield spreads
change in reaction to a higher debt ratio (β1), b) the macroeconomic envi-
ronment (inflation pi and real GDP growth g) and c) the persistence of the
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yield spreads (β0). If a more persistent risk is priced by the financial markets
(β0 increases), this can reduce a government’s incentive to pursue a ”laissez-
faire” fiscal policy, or a countercyclical fiscal policy, when the overall deficit
increases. Indeed, when β0 increases, the threshold value is larger.
3. Empirical Evidence
3.1. Data and econometric methodology
We now estimate the parameters of Equations 3 and 4. The sources of
data are presented in Appendix.
In Equation 3, the endogenous variable is the first-difference of the pri-
mary balance ratio. The exogenous variables are the lagged overall deficit (in
% of GDP) and the lagged debt ratio (Government consolidated gross debt
over GDP). To capture ”true” policy reaction and neutralize changes in the
primary balance coming from automatic stabilizers, we add the output-gap
as a control variable. This variable is measured using HP filter.
In Equation 4, the endogenous variable is the sovereign yield spread mea-
sured as follows. We take the long-run interest rate (EMU convergence crite-
rion bond yields) and we substact the riskless risk computed as zero-coupon
yield curve spot rate (AAA-rated euro area central government bonds) with
a maturity of 30 years. The explanatory variables are the current account
balance as percentage of GDP, harmonized unemployment rate, share price
indices (prices of common shares of companies traded on national or foreign
stock exchanges), short-term rates (short-term borrowing rates between fi-
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nancial institutions or short-term government paper rates issued or traded in
the market). We further consider a financial stress indicator (country-Level
Index of Financial Stress -CLIFS-).
Data are taken from OECD Statistics (OECD.Stat), the European Statis-
tical Office (Eurostat) and the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. We consider
a panel of 15 countries of the European Union4, over the period from 2002
to 2018 at quarterly frequency.
Both Equations 3 and 4 are estimated using panel quantile regressions
to account for heterogeneity across time and countries. We use the estima-
tor proposed by Machado and Santos Silva (2019). We briefly outline the
methodology and refer the reader to the authors paper for details.
Consider a generic model with the couple (yit, Xit) where yit is the en-
dogenous variable and Xit is the vector of explanatory variables. We consider
N countries (i = 1..., N) and T quarters (t = 1, ..., T ). In standard OLS re-
gression, one estimates the conditional mean of the variable y by considering
ther regression equation:
yit = γi +X
′
itδ + σ it, it = yit − E[yit/Xit]. (11)
for i = 1, ...N and t = 1, ...T . it ≈ iid(0, ). σ is a scale parameter used
for instance to account for heteroscedastic residuals. The conditional mean
4Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom
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equation cannot account for the conditional behavior of y when samples
are characterized by strong heterogeneities. In this case, the conditional
expectation is replaced by a conditional quantile:
yit(τ) = γi(τ) +X
′
itδ(τ) + it(τ), it(τ) = yit −Qτ [yit/Xit]. (12)
The τ -th conditional quantile is defined by:
Qτ [yit/Xit] = inf{yit/F (yit/Xit ≥ τ}, τ ∈ (0, 1). (13)
F (.) denotes the conditional distribution of the endogenous variable and is
strictly increasing. Equation 12 is robust to distribution with heavy tails
and outliers. Quantile regressions have become widely used since the 1990s
in the empirical economics literature. For an overview of the theory and
applications, the interested reader can refer to Koenker et al. (2017).
Consider the check function ρτ (it) = (τ − I(it < 0)). I(x) is the heav-
iside function. A typical - consistent and asymptotically Normal- quantile
estimator is defined by
(γˆi(τ), δˆ(τ)) ∈ argmax
γi,δ
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
ρτ (yit − γi −X ′itδ). (14)
Machado and Santos Silva (2019) relate the heterogeneous behaviors in a
sample to heteroscedasticity. They propose the following model:
yit = γi +X
′
itδ + [µi(τ) + Z
′
itω(τ)]it,  ≈ iid(0, 1). (15)
Z is the group of variables that are the source of heteroscedastic residuals.
If Zit = Xit, the conditional quantile function is written as:
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Qτ [yit/Xit] = Θ
1
i (τ) +X
′
itΘ
2
i (τ), (16)
Θ1i (τ) = γi + µi(τ), Θ
2
i (τ) = δ + ω(τ).
The authors propose a GMM estimator to obtain the estimations of the
coefficients.
Heteroscedasticity in empirical public finance is a topic that is usually not
treated by most papers. However, there are several reasons why we consider
this aspect here.
First, as overall deficits, debt ratios or output-gaps change, the variability
of primary balance adjustment can vary substantially accross countries and
time. In a context of lack of coordination of fiscal policies in the EU, the
primary balance sample is likely to contain ”outliers”. The latter can be a
cause of heteroscedasticity in the residuals of Equation 3.
Second, the EU does not meet the traditional conditions of an optimum
currency area, because of heterogeneous macroeconomic fundamentals (infla-
tion differentials, differences in external and internal balances), asymmetric
shocks (incomplete risk-sharing between countries) and different resiliences
to shocks (reflected for instance by differences in financial stress indicators
across countries and time). This is a source of variability in the risk premia
because financial markets view the EU as a fragmented market. Equation 4
is therefore also likely to have heteroscedastic residuals.
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3.2. Estimation results
Equation 3 - policy reaction function - is estimated as follows
∆sit(λ1) = µ
1
i (λ1) + α(λ1)w1it + β(λ1)w2it + ω3(λ1)gapit + 
s
it(λ1), (17)
w1it = (defit−1 − τ1) and w2it = (dit−1 − τ2), λ1 ∈ (0, 1).
gap is the output-gap. µ1i is a country fixed effect. The estimation results
are shown in Table 1. Quantile regressions are estimated at nine different
quantiles (λ1 = 0.10, 0.20, 0.30, 0.40, 0.50, 0.60, 0.70, 0.80, 0.90), with the
estimates reported in the first nine columns of the table. The standard er-
rors are reported in parentheses. For comparison, the results from ordinary
least-squares regression (OLS) are also shown in the last column. Figure 1
presents a summary of the estimations. The solid line represents the point
estimates with the shaded gray area depicting a 95% pointwise confidence
band.
An increase in the gap between the overall deficit and its target leads
governments to strengthen their adjustment of the primary balance. Since
the endogenous variable is already the variation of the primary balance, any
change reflects a higher intensity of variation. The coefficients α are positive,
sinificant, and increase accross quantiles. Therefore, countries that usually
managed to have high increases in their primary deficits (they are located at
the high quantiles of the endogenous variable ∆sit) tend to be more reactive
than the others in reducing new overall deficits. Conversely, countries that
usually do not reduce their primary deficits widely (those located at the low-
est quantiles) are less reactive in adjusting their primary balance in response
20
to new overall deficits.
With regard to the debt ratio coefficient, the quantile estimates suggest
that governments do not react to changes in the debt ratio gap by adjusting
their primary budget surplus. This suggests that fiscal policy has been non-
Ricardian, in the sense that no fiscal consolidation has taken place in order
to maintain the debt ratio below the threshold. It is important to notice
that we are testing the reaction of primary balances, not to the debt ratio
per se, but to the debt ratio gaps. In this formulation, what matters for fiscal
reaction is debt target. There are several reasons why governments may not
be reactive to an annual debt target at 60%.
One reason is that the target that matters to governments is not the in-
stitutional threshold, set by the European authorities. They are likely to
be more sensitive to other debt thresholds, for instance those that trigger a
debt overhang (when public debt starts to have negative externalities such
as crowding out effects for private and public investment, Ricardian equiva-
lence behavior, excessive risk-premium). Empirical estimates of the so-called
Laffer debt curve suggest that, in the advanced countries, negative effects of
higher indebtedness are in place when a threshold of 90% of the debt ratio
is reached, e.g. much higher than 60% (see Lee et al. 2017, Checherita-
Westphal and Rother 2012, Reinhart et al. 2012). Eberhardt and Presbitero
(2015) show evidence of heterogeneous -country-specific - peaks of the debt
ratio in the Laffer debt curves, between 7% and 150%. In this context, gov-
ernments are likely to adjust the primary balance only in relation to the debt
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ratio from which public debt becomes detrimental to economic activity.
Another reason why the coefficients β are statistically insignificant is that
the threshold τ2 that matters is the governments’ level of tolerance for public
debt. This level is endogenenous and likely to vary accross countries and
time. In this case, by imposing the yearly constraint τ2 = 60% in the regres-
sion, there is a risk that the estimated coefficients are inconsistent. The fact
that the quantile coefficients equal zero at all quantiles suggest that fiscal
policy does not appear to adjust in order to satisfy the governments’ budget
constraint.
The response of fiscal policy to the output-gap is positive - and the coeffi-
cients are statistically significant at 5% level of significance-, with a widening
output-gap leading to an improved primary balance. The coefficients vary
from single to triple when one moves from the lowest to the highest quantiles,
between 0.08 and 0.27.
Quantile Regression OLS
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
α 0.576*** 0.628*** 0.67*** 0.711*** 0.742*** 0.772** 0.797*** 0.824*** 0.863*** 0.637***
(0.098) (0.076) (0.06) (0.05) (0.047) (0.049) (0.054) (0.063) (0.078) (0.03)
β 0.0013 -0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0028 -0.0037 -0.0046 -0.0054 -0.0063 -0.0075 - 0.028***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.01) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.004)
gap 0.088 0.1217** 0.149*** 0.176*** 0.197*** 0.216*** 0.233*** 0.251*** 0.276*** 0.162***
(0.076) (0.058) (0.046) (0.038) (0.036) (0.037) (0.041) (0.048) (0.06) (0.035)
Table 1: Quantile Regression for the Fiscal Function Reaction
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Figure 1: Quantile regression for the Fiscal Function Reaction
As for the estimates of the yield spread equation, several interesting find-
ings emerge (see Table 2 and Figure 2). We estimate the following quantile
regression:
∆
[
rit−r∗it
]
(λ2) = µ
2
i (λ2)+β0(λ2)
[
rit−1−r∗it−1
]
+β1(λ2)dit−1+β2(λ2)∆X
′
it+
r
it(λ2).
(18)
λ2 ∈ (0, 1) is a quantile. µ2i (λ2) is a country fixed effect.
We find that the macroeconomic fundamentals -debt, unemployment and
current account - do not matter in the pricing of default risk in yield spreads.
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Neither does the global risk (FSI perceived by the markets). Indeed, all quan-
tile coefficients are insignificant for these variables at 5% significance level.
There are two potential explanations to this result.
On the one side, this evidence is in line with previous studies suggest-
ing that financial markets may have been irrational - in the sense that the
determination of premia have relied on self-fulfilling expectations and have
been driven by shift in market sentiments, rather than on fundamentals -
in pricing the risks of sovereign defaults (see, among others, Ayres, 2019,
Chang and Leblond 2015, De Grauwe and Ji 1013, 2014). This weakens the
fiscal discipline coming from the markets, as can be seen from the interval of
variation of α in Proposition 2. Indeed, when the value of β1 becomes small,
the fiscal adjustment needed to reach the sustainability of public finances
becomes stronger (the upper bound of the interval is larger). And when the
effort for adjusting becomes stronger, governments are more likely to avoid it.
An alternative explanation is that investors pay a greater attention to
liquidity risk than to solvency risk. Macroeconomic fundamentals are im-
portant to investigate whether countries are able to repay their debt at all
points in the future. But, for shorter time horizons, other factors matter like
the market value of liquid assets available to meet the maturing liabilities,
or market short-term interest rate since they influence debt servicing.
As is seen from Table 2 and Figure 2, the coefficients of share prices are
statistically significant at quantiles around the median. The negative signs
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can be interpreted as follows. A decrease in share prices imply higher risk
of equity investing. And, higher equity risk imply a steeper slope of the
risk premia. The results also show statistically significant coefficients for the
short-term interest rates at quantiles around the mean. Because they can
increase the burden of debt service, higher short-term rates lead to steeper
risk premium slope in sovereign bonds markets.
Quantile Regression OLS
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
β0 -0.1617 -0.0732 -0.0207 0.0251 0.0655 0.1064 0.1500** 0.2008** 0.2744** 0.0400***
(0.1308) (0.0955) (0.0789) (0.0685) (0.0651) (0.0679) (0.0766) (0.0921) (0.1191) (0.0100)
β1 -0.0040 -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0035 -0.0035 -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0031 -0.0014**
(0.0049) (0.0035) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0005)
Share prices -0.0067 -0.0062 -0.0059** -0.0057** -0.0054** -0.0052** -0.0050 -0.0047 -0.0043 -0.0054***
(0.0045) (0.0033) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0032) (0.0042) (0.0013)
Current account balance 0.0090 0.0060 0.0049 0.0034 0.0022 0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0020 -0.0043 0.0024
(0.006) (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0037)
Unemployment -0.1460 -0.0773 -0.0366 -0.0009 0.0303 0.062 0.0958 0.1352 0.1923 0.0630
(0.1569) (0.1137) (0.0929) (0.0805) (0.0764) (0.0798) (0.0908) (0.1102) (0.1450) (0.0443)
Financial stress index 0.2032 0.2971 0.3528 0.4015 0.4443 0.4877 0.5340 0.5879 0.666 0.4748*
(0.8508) (0.6159) (0.5031) (0.4358) (0.4135) (0.4321) (0.4922) (0.5976) (0.7871) (0.2852)
Short interest rate 0.1707 0.1556* 0.1466** 0.1388** 0.1319** 0.1249** 0.1175* 0.1088 0.0963 0.1430***
(0.1229) (0.0890) (0.0727) (0.0629) (0.0597) (0.0624) (0.0711) (0.0863) (0.1137) (0.0462)
Table 2: Quantile Regression for the dynamics of the yield spread
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Figure 2: Quantile regression for the Dynamics of the Yield Spread
3.3. Implications for fiscal sustainability
Using the econometric estimates, we now investigate whether the condi-
tions in Propositions 1 and 2 are satisfied. We consider the joint distribu-
tion of both endogenous variables in Equations 3 and 4, e.g. ∆st(λ1) and
∆
[
rt − r∗t
]
(λ2). ∆st measures the size of fiscal adjustment (large-scale fiscal
adjustments or low-scale fiscal adjustments). The size of an adjustment can
be related to quantiles. The adjustment is smaller at lower quantiles and
larger at higher quantiles. Similarly, as one moves from the lowest to the
highest quantiles of the distribution of ∆
[
rt − r∗t
]
(λ2), changes in the risk
premium becomes greater. We therefore differentiate between low and high
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intensity changes in the risk premium. Crossing both variables, we delimitate
four situations depending on λ1 and λ2 (see Table 3).
λ1
λ2
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1
Small fiscal adjustments
Low intensity changes in yield spreads
(Region I)
Small fiscal adjustments
High intensity changes in yield spreads
(Region II)
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Large fiscal adjustments
Low intensity changes in yield spreads
(Region III)
Large fiscal adjustments
High intensity changes in yield spreads
(Region IV)
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Table 3: Delimitation of regions according to the values of the quantiles
In Table 4, we report the values of the upper bound of the interest rate-
growth differential as defined in Proposition 1, e.g. αˆ(λ1)− βˆ0(λ2) (a ”hat”
means that we consider the estimates of α and β). The literature has ex-
tensively discussed the implications of the sign of this differential on debt
dynamics. When it is positive, a primary surplus is needed to stabilize the
debt ratio. When it is negative, the debt ratio can be reduced even with
primary deficits. Proposition 1 does not refer to ”zero” as the benchmark
for the differential, but to a threshold value that depends on αˆ (fiscal policy
stance) and βˆ0 (degree of inertia of yield spreads). A country can sustain
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higher debt, with no fiscal cost -without adjusting -, even if the interest
rate-growth differential is positive. The larger the value of the bound, the
lower the likelihood of observing a snowball effect in the debt ratio dynamics.
In the table, we see that, for given quantiles λ2, the bound αˆ(λ1) − βˆ0(λ2)
increases as λ1 varies from small to high values.
λ1
λ2
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
0.1 0.739 0.650 0.598 0.552 0.511 0.470 0.427 0.376 0.302
0.2 0.790 0.701 0.649 0.603 0.563 0.522 0.478 0.427 0.354
0.3 0.833 0.744 0.692 0.646 0.605 0.565 0.521 0.470 0.397
0.4 0.873 0.785 0.732 0.686 0.646 0.605 0.561 0.510 0.437
0.5 0.904 0.816 0.763 0.717 0.677 0.636 0.592 0.542 0.468
0.6 0.934 0.845 0.793 0.747 0.707 0.666 0.622 0.571 0.498
0.7 0.959 0.870 0.818 0.772 0.732 0.691 0.647 0.596 0.523
0.8 0.987 0.898 0.846 0.800 0.759 0.718 0.675 0.624 0.550
0.9 1.025 0.936 0.884 0.838 0.798 0.757 0.713 0.662 0.589
Table 4: Table 4 : α(λ1)− β0(λ2)
In Table 1, we have seen that αˆ(λ1) was an increasing value of λ1, mean-
ing that larger fiscal adjustments reflect stronger reactions of the primary
balance to changes in the overall deficit gap. The increasing values of the
bound thereby suggest that the stronger the fiscal reaction to overall deficits,
the lower the likelihood to endure a snowball effect in the debt ratio. Now,
for given values of λ1, the bound (αˆ(λ1) − βˆ0(λ2) decreases as λ2 increases.
Since, we have seen in Table 2 that βˆ0(λ2) is an inceasing value of λ2, the
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results shown in the table imply that a higher persistence in the yield spread
increases the likelihood of a snowball effect - because the value of the upper
bound becomes smaller.
For purpose of illustration, we select some countries which belong to the
different regions. We plot their interest rate-growth differential along with
the average limit αˆ(λ1)− βˆ0(λ2) of the region (dotted line). Figures 3, 4 and
5 show the cases of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and
Spain. We see that, except in times of crises (during the beginning 2000s, the
2008 financial crisis, or during the European debt crises from 2010 onwards),
situations of interest rate-growth differentials below the ceiling leading to
unsustainable public finances has been the historical norm. During crises,
recessions push the growth-adjusted interest rates down in all countries (this
is a common factor to all real interest rates).
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Figure 3: Interest-growth differential - France and Germany
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Figure 4: Interest-growth differential - Italy and the Netherlands
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Figure 5: Interest-growth differential - Portugal and Spain
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However, the role of the interest rates is uneven accross crountries. Some
economies like Portugal and Spain have suffered from more frequent episodes
of ”high” nominal interest rates (for instance during the EU debt crises),
thereby implying that the growth-adjusted interest rate crosses the thresh-
old value more frequently than in other countries. (α−β0) can be thought as
a ”cut off” limit of the growth adjusted interest rate which guarantees that
indebtedness in sovereign bond markets would not tend to rise debt service
- and therefore overall deficits - to unsustainable levels. Figures 3, 4 and 5
suggest that, even though (α − β0) sometimes evolves above the limit, such
a deviation is temporary.
We now look at Proposition 2. Since βˆ is statistically insignificant for all
quantiles, the assumption to be tested on α is:

Hα0 : α(λ1) = 0 (sustainable public finances),
against
Hα1 : α(λ1) > 0 (unustainable public finances).
This amounts to testing whether α is statistically significant. In the quan-
tile regressios, from Table 1, we see that the null hypothesis is systematically
rejected at 1% level of significance. However, this is not enough to conclude
that debt and deficits are stable in the medium/long term. As stated by
Proposition 2, a prerequesite to create a safe fiscal regime where public fi-
nances remain stable in the face of external shocks is that governments are
reactive enough to changes in both overall deficits and debt ratio. So, satisfy-
ing the constraint on β is also necessary. Since β1 is statistically insignificant
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in Table 2, the inequality on β amounts to testing:

Hβ0 : β(λ1, λ2) ≤ βH0(λ1, λ2) = [(α− 1)]β0(λ1, λ2) + α(λ1)(pi − g),
against
Hβ1 : β(λ1, λ2) > β
H0(λ1, λ2).
The inequality on β in proposition 2 is satisfied if βH0 is rejected. Table 5
reports the values of βH0(λ1, λ2). The values of (pi − g) used are the average
for each quantile λ1. The stars denote the cases for which the null hypothesis
is rejected. They are quite a few (7% of all possibilities, e.g. 4 out of 61). In
the vast majority of cases, Hβ0 cannot be rejected. The rejection occurs in
very specific cases: when the coefficient of β are negative, e.g. when primary
deficits could increase a little, high changes in the risk premium. Only in
these rare cases, can the null hypothesis be rejected.
λ1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
λ2 ∈ [0.1, 0.6] 0.06 0.09 0.21 0.3 0.38 0.51 0.64 0.78 0.99
λ2 = 0.7 -0.06* 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.34 0.47 0.60 0.75 0.97
λ2 = 0.8 -0.02* 0.01 0.15 0.24 0.33 0.46 0.53 0.74 0.96
λ2 = 0.9 -0.06* -0.014* 0.123 0.219 0.315 0.446 0.58 0.73 0.95
Table 5: Values of βH0
The restrictions on α and β in Proposition 2 suggest that achieving deficits
and debt targets, through adjusting primary balance, should be done jointly.
According to our estimates, this does not seem to resonate with the EU
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experience. There are several ways of interpreting our findings. A first
reason may be that debt-related fiscal rules in practice do not focus on the
sustainability of public finances. Even under prudent fiscal policies, sovereign
debts are contracted to finance public spending for the purpose of maximizing
growth. Second, up until the recent TSCG (Treaty on Stability, Coordination
and Governance), there were no rules for returning to the 60% target once
the latter was breached.
3.4. Anchoring fiscal behaviors to debt target?
To make the sustainability of public finances more effective, a new rule
has been introduced by the TSCG in 2013, imposing a corrective mecha-
nism : countries must reduce by one-twentieth each year any excess of debt
over the 60% benchmark. By constraining the use of fiscal discretion, this
new rule amounts to setting a debt anchor to governments. A motivation
is that imposing a target on headline fiscal deficits alone is not effective in
achieving debt sustainability, because the channels from fiscal balances to
debt involves many factors that are not under the direct control of govern-
ments (the macroeconomic environment prevailing before, during and after
fiscal efforts take place). Another reason is the predominant view among
European policymakers that the new rule represent a permanent constraint
on fiscal policy, that avoid creating self-fulfilling debt crises. A corrective
mechanism can help sending a signal to sovereign bond markets and avoid
excessively increasing risk premia.
We specify a new rule for fiscal policy defined as follows:
∆sit = α (def
T
it−1 − τ1) + β (dit−1 − τ2) + sit, (19)
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where defTit is the overall balance anchor, defined as the headline fiscal bal-
ance ratio that stabilizes the debt ratio at time t in country i, under the
TSCG corrective rule. Targeting the overall balance for which the debt ratio
remains stable is not enough, since the condition ∆dit = 0 is compatible
with an infinity number of debt ratios. For the EU Commission, a good
fiscal situation is not only to stabilize the debt ratios, but also to avoid that
deficits become too high. Therefore defining a limit τ1 on overall deficit is
also necessary.
Using the standard equation of debt dynamics, it can be easily shown
that, under the corrective mechanism, we have:
defTit = [git + piit]dit−1 −
τ2 − dit−1
80
. (20)
We divide by 80, assuming that an annual (1/20)th reduction of the excess
debt is equivalent to a (1/80)th reduction each quarter. gt and pit are the real
GDP growth rate and inflation at time t. τ2 = 60%/4. Thought the rule is
recent, we investigate its implications on public finance sustainability, had it
be followed by the EU countries.
We first re-estimate the primary balance equation with the new rule, using
again quantile estimators and, adding the output-gap as a control variable
(see Table 6). * and ** indicate that a coefficient is statistically significant
at, respectively, 10% and 5%. gap is the output gap. The new estimates show
several differences compared with those in Table 1. For almost all quantiles
(except at the lowest and highest) the primary balance is now reactive to
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changes in the debt ratio and the coefficient does not vary that much across
quantiles. The correcting mechanism imposed by the TSCG would have
forced the countries to behave in a similar way. However, heterogeneous
behaviors remain with regard to the coefficient α. Indeed, the countries
that adjust their debt-stabilizing overall deficit to the threshold are those
for which the required fiscal effort would be weak (small adjustments of the
primary balance at the lowest quantiles).
Quantile Regression OLS
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
α 0.0041** 0.0033* 0.0026* 0.0018 0.0008 60.0002 -0.001 -0.0017 -0.0024 0.0001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0012)
β 0.021 0.021 0.022* 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022* 0.022 0.022 0.006
(0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.017) (0.005)
gap 0.093 0.095 0.096* 0.098** 0.102** 0.106** 0.108* 0.111 0.114 0.09**
(0.077) (0.065) (0.056) (0.048) (0.045) (0.049) (0.058) (0.067) (0.078) (0.043)
Table 6: Quantile Regression with the TSCG rule
We now examine the conditions under which the new rule would have led
to sustainable public finances. The system to study is (we omit the index i):

∆dt = (rt − gt)dt−1 − st,
∆st = βdt−1 + α(gt−1 + pit−1)dt−2 − α( τ2−dt−280 )
−(ατ1 + βτ2) + st ,
∆(rt − r∗t ) = β0(rt−1 − r∗t−1) + β1dt−1 + β2∆X ′t + rt .
(21)
The steady state of the system is given by
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
s = d(r − g),
d =
ατ1+βτ2+
α
80
τ2
β+α(g+pi)+ α
80
,
r = r∗ β0−1
β0
− β1
β0
d¯− β2
β0
∆X
′
,
(22)
This allows us to write the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the fixed point
(d, s, r):
J =

(r − g) −1 d
β + α
(
g + pi + 1
80
)
0 0
β1 0 β0
 (23)
We now write the Ruth-Hurwitz conditions for the stability of the fixed
point under the following assumptions that summarize our findings in the
econometric estimations: α = 0 (this coefficient is insignificant for a majority
of quantiles in Table 6) and β1 = 0 (from the estimates of this coefficient in
Table 2). The sign restrictions on the trace and determinant of the Jacobian
matrix lead the following inequalities:
trace(J) < 0 =⇒ r − g < β0,
det(J) < 0 =⇒ β0 β < 0,
trace(J2)− [(trace(J)2] < 0 =⇒ β > −β0(r − g).
(24)
These three conditions can only be satisfied simultaneously if, at least,
β0 < 0. Negative values of this coefficient means that the yield spread dynam-
ics is non-monotonic but sinusoidal. A sine wave indicates that the spreads
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are ”mean-reverting”, which is not compatible with momentum dynamics in
the sovereign bond markets. As is seen from the first condition in the system,
a negative β0 implies that the growth-adjusted interest rate must be nega-
tive. Looking at the preceding figures of the time varying (r− g) (Figures 3,
4, 5), we see that historical interest-growth differentials have frequetly been
positive in the EU since 2002. Further, looking again at the regressions in
Table 2, we observe that for the highest quantiles λ2 = 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, β0 is
statisticially significant and positive (countries located in Regions II and IV
in Table 3). In this case, the third inegality of the Routh-Hurwitz condition
is violated.
In conclusion, calibrating a correction mechanism so that the debt re-
mains below the annual ceiling of 60% of GDP, would not necessarily have
helped the EU countries to avoid non-sustainable public finance, even in the
most optimistic situation where governments would have chosen, on their
side, to target their debt stabilizing overall deficits near the limit of 3%.
Amongst the factors that could have endangered fiscal sustainability, the
macro-financial environment plays a decisive role through the influence of fi-
nancial market rates, real growth rates, or momentum dynamics in sovereign
bond markets.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a behavioral approach to investigate the
conditions of the sustainability of public finances in the EU since the be-
ginning 2000s. The overall picture is that debt ratios and primary deficits
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have been far from being sustainable. Fiscal reaction functions reveal that
governments have not paid attention to the debt gap when adjusting their
primary balances, even when they benefited from a favorable financial envi-
ronment when the interest rates -adjusted for growth - were below the levels
implying a snowball effect. We provide evidence that, even if they had been
forced to focus their fiscal efforts on correcting the deviations of debt from
their ceiling -through a correcting mechanism - this would not necessarily
have changed the likelihood that debt and deficits become more sustainable.
Our main message is, however, that governments should not, necessarily, be
blamed for not being rigorous enough in their fiscal efforts to avoid rising
debts and deficits. We have seen that reducing primary deficits in response
to rising overall deficits has been important for the EU fiscal authorities.
Indeed, the coefficients αˆ in the first regression is statistically significant for
all quantiles. The picture here is the opposite of the so-called phenomenon
of fiscal fatigue. We have seen that αˆ(λ1) increases with λ1. This suggests
that countries have been more reactive in adjusting their primary balance,
in response to a change in the overall deficit, if they were already used to
adjust their primary balance more strongly than other countries.
This papers could be extended in several ways. First, it would be inter-
esting to investigate other fiscal reactions functions based on expenditure,
revenue, structural primary balance, golden rule, etc. Second, there are po-
tential applications to other geographical areas, for instance by examining
the case of OECD countries. Third, it could be interesting considering a
more general decomposition of the debt dynamic equations, by investigating
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how international factors such as the exchange rate, foreign interest rates
contribute directly to debt increases through their impact on debt service.
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5. Appendix
5.1. Steady State
˙d(t) = 0 ; then
(r − r∗ − g)d+ r∗d− s = 0
s = [r − r∗ − g] + r∗d
s = d[r − r∗ − g +
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s = d[r − g]
˙s(t) = 0 ; then
α[d(r + pi)pi − τ1 − s] + β(d− τ2) = 0
αd(r + pi)− α(τ1 + s) + βd− βτ2 = 0
αd(r + pi) + βd = α(τ1 + s) + βτ2; and s = d(r − g)
αd(r + pi) + βd = α(τ1 + d(r − g)) + βτ2
αd(r + pi) + βd− αd(r − g) = ατ1 + βτ2
d[αr + αpi + β − αr + αg] = ατ1 + βτ2
d =
ατ1 + βτ2
α(pi + g) + β
(A.2)
˙r(t) = 0 ; then
˙r(t)− r∗(t) = β0[r(t)− r∗(t)] + β1d(t) + β2∆X ′(t) = 0
˙r(t) = β0[r(t)− r∗(t)] + β1d(t) + β2∆X ′(t) + r∗(t) = 0
β0
[
r − r∗]+ β1d+ β2∆X ′ + r∗ = 0
β0r = β0r
∗ − β1d− β2∆X ′ − r∗
β0r = r
∗(β0 − 1)− β1
[
ατ1 + βτ2 − s
α(pi + g) + β
]
− β2∆X ′ − r
r = r∗
(β0 − 1)
β0
− β1
β0
[
ατ1 + βτ2 − s
α(pi + g) + β
]
− β2
β0
∆X
′
(A.3)
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To sum up, the analytical expression of the steady state is:

s = d[r − g]
d = ατ1+βτ2
α(pi+g)+β
r = r∗ (β0−1)
β0
− β1
β0
[
ατ1+βτ2
α(pi+g)+β
]
− β2
β0
∆X
′
This allows us to write the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the fixed point
(d, s, r) :
J =

(r − r∗ − g) + r∗ −1 1
[α(r − r∗ + pi) + β] + αr∗ −α αd
β1 0 β0

J =

(r − g) −1 1
α(r + pi) + β −α αd
β1 0 β0

Routh-Hurwitz conditions Let A be a square matrix of order 3 with ar-
bitrary coefficients as the one given. The characteristic polynomial is given
by:
P (λ) = λ3 − trace(A)λ2 − 1
2
(
trace(A2)− (trace(A))2)λ− det(A)
According to the Routh-Hurwitz conditions the necessary condition is
that the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial should be positive. This
implies that all the roots of the characteristic equation should have nega-
tive real parts (the roots of P (λ), or the eigenvalues of the matrix A), and
48
thus that the dynamic system characterized by the matrix A is stable. The
conditions can be summarized as follows:
trace(A) < 0
trace(A2)− (trace(A)− (trace(A))2) < 0
det(A) < 0
1
2
trace(A)
(
trace(A2)− (trace(A))2) > det(A)
The last condition is satisfied if the first two are also satisfied, so that:
trace(A)
(
trace(A2)− (trace(A))2) > 0 > det(A)
5.2. Stability conditions
First condition: trace(J) < 0
r − g − α + β0 < 0
r − g + β0 < α
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Second condition: trace(J2)− (trace(J))2 < 0
(r − g)2 − 2α(r − pi)− 2β + 2β1 + α2 + β20 − (r − g)2 + 2α(r − g)− 2β0(r − g)
−α2 + 2αβ0 − β20 < 0
2β1 − 2α(r − pi)− 2β + 2α(r − g)− 2β0(r − g) + 2αβ0 < 0
β1 − α(r − pi)− β + α(r − g)− β0(r − g) + αβ0 < 0
α[r − g − r + pi + β0] + β1 − β − β0 < 0
α[β0 + pi − g]− β − β0 + β1 < 0
β > α(β0 + pi − g) + (β1 − β0)
Third condition: det(J) < 0
β1α + β0[α(r + pi) + β]− αβ0(r − g)− β1αd < 0
β1α(1− d) + β0[α(r + pi) + β − α(r − g)] < 0
β1α(1− d) + β0[α(r + pi − r + g) + β] < 0
β1α(1− d) + β0[α(pi + g) + β] < 0
β1α(1− d) + β0α(pi + g) + β0β < 0
α[β1(1− d) + β0(pi + g)] + β0β < 0
α[β1(1− d) + β0(pi + g)] < −β0β
−α[β1(1− d) + β0(pi + g)] > β0β
α[β1(d− 1)− β0(pi − g)] > β0β
α >
β0β
β1(d− 1)− β0(pi − g)
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5.3. Data description
Name Description Source Period Covered
Current account
balance (CAB)
Current account balance as % of GDP. OECD.Stat
2002Q1 - 2018Q3
Except for:
Belgium
2003Q1 - 2018Q3
Netherlands
2002Q2 - 2018Q3
Financial Stress
Index (FSI)
Country-Level Index of Financial Stress (CLIFS)
(monthly)
ECB Statistical
Data Warehouse
2002Q1 - 2018Q3
Real GDP
Quarterly growth rates of real GDP,
change over previous quarter
OECD.Stat 2002Q1 - 2018Q3
Debt ratio Government consolidated gross debt Eurostat 2002Q1 - 2018Q2
Inflation rate
Inflation, average consumer prices
annual percentage change (monthly)
Eurostat 2002Q1 - 2018Q3
Long-term
interest rate
EMU convergence criterion bond yields
(percentage per annum)
Eurostat 2002Q1 - 2018Q3
Short-term interest rate % per annum OECD Data Stat 2002Q1 - 2018Q3
Deficit ratio
Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-)
(Unadjusted data (i.e. neither seasonally adjusted
nor calendar adjusted data)
Eurostat 2002Q1 - 2018Q2
Riskless interest rate
Zero-cupon yield curve spot rate
(AAA-rated euro area central government
bonds); maturity 30 years.
Eurostat
2004Q4 - 2018Q3
Same for all countries
Share prices Index OECD Data Stat 2002Q1 - 2018Q3
Primary Balance ratio
Own estimation
= (100)(Net lending/100)+
(nominal interest rate/100 * debt ratio (t-1)/100*1/(1+growth rate)
Unemployment rate Harmonised unemployment rate OECD Data Stat 2002Q1 - 2018Q3
Potential GDP Potential gross domestic product
Primary balance
The primary balance (in % of GDP) is constructed as follows:
Primary balance (% GDP) = Overall balance (% GDP) + interest pay-
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ments (% GDP)
st = net lending (% GDP) + it−1 dt−1
1
(1 + g˜t)
where it is nominal interest rate, dt is debt ratio and g˜t is nominal GDP
growth rate between quarters t− 1 and t.
Output-gap
The output gap us defined using HP filter, and we define:
Output gap =
y0 − yp
yp
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